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Important regulatory failures have been identified in the wake of
the recent financial crisis, and comprehensive regulatory reform has been
much on the minds of policymakers. Reform proposals call for a number of
significant changes to the scope and structure of financial regulation to
address systemic risk. 1 With banking regulation, however, the twin tools of
capital requirements and external supervision seem to remain the dominant
regulatory levers.2 In this short discussion, I introduce the contours of an
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1 On scope, previously unregulated or lightly regulated financial entities-hedge
funds and private equity firms most prominently-are likely to become subject to
more exacting regulation and oversight. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulatory Reform (March 26, 2009), available
at http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg72.html (proposing registration for
advisers to hedge funds and other private pools of capital whose assets under
management exceed a certain threshold). On structure, many have called for some
form of unified financial regulatory authority to assume jurisdiction over all
financial institutions, including banks, savings and loans, insurance companies,
investment banks, and hedge funds. Id. (calling for a single independent systemic
risk regulator). The Federal Reserve could be designated as the primary systemic
risk regulator. See Stephen Labaton, Some Lawmakers Question Expanded Reach
for the Fed, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/18/business/l 8regulate.html?dbk (noting the
controversy over President Obama's proposal to expand the Federal Reserve's
powers to police systemic financial risk). Or perhaps a council of financial
regulators could be formed. See Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke, in Nod to Critics,
Suggests Board of Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, October 1, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02fbusiness/economy/02regulate.html?scp=3&sq
=committee%20regulators&st=-cse.
2 To the extent that policymakers have considered bank executives' compensation,
they have focused primarily on limiting it, or imposing vague prohibitions on
compensation that promotes excessive risk taking. See Deborah Solomon & Mark
Maremont, Bankers Face Strict New Pay Cap, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2009, at Al,
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important supplement to the existing approach, a governance approach that
uses bank executives' compensation arrangements as a policy lever. 3 I
propose that bank executives receive some portion of their compensation in
the form of their own bank's publicly issued debt securities. Taking a page
from the pay-for-performance movement, I argue that paying bank
executives-at least in part-with bank debt securities can blunt the risk
taking proclivities that shareholder-centered corporate governance
encourages and that equity-based compensation exacerbates. My proposal
piggybacks on prior suggestions that banks be required to issue
subordinated debt as a device to induce market discipline to counter
excessive risk taking.
Requiring bankers to hold their own bonds would not substitute for
traditional external regulation but would enhance it by directly altering
bank managers' incentives toward risk taking. "Unlike capital and asset
regulation, which have at best indirect effects on managerial incentives and
thus on managerial decisions, altering top-management compensation is a
direct and effective way of influencing managerial return and risk-taking
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 123457165806186405.html; Alison
Vekshin & Erik Schatzker, Bair Says Regulators Should Set Banker Pay Standards,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 5, 2009,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news ?pid=
20601087&sid=agRkbLlnrc6Q. In addition, the Obama administration has
appointed attorney Kenneth Feinberg as a special master to oversee executive
compensation at seven firms that have received "exceptional assistance" from the
government in the form of federal bailout funds. See Times Topics: People,
Kenneth R. Feinberg, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/
people/f/kenneth r feinberg/index.html?inline=nyt-per.
Only very recently have a few concrete proposals emerged to structure
bank executive compensation to curb risk taking, in ways distinct from my
proposal. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers'Pay,
641 GEO. L. J. _ (forthcoming 2009-20 10) (proposing that financial executives'
pay should include not just their firms' equity, but should reflect a diversified
basket of their firms' securities), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1410072;
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing
and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009) (arguing that
financial executives' equity-based compensation be entirely in the form of
restricted stock and restricted stock options that must be held until several years
after they have left their firms), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1336978.
While these proposals, like mine, may help to blunt financial executives' risk
taking incentives, they do not incorporate a direct mechanism to impose market
discipline on banks and their executives for excessive risk taking, a benefit that
subordinated debt compensation offers.
3 My discussion is relevant for other depositary institutions as well, including
thrifts and credit unions. For convenience, I will refer to them collectively as
"banks," as they all share the regulatory issues discussed herein.
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incentives." 4 In Part II, I explain the special regulatory and governance
problems of banks. Part III describes my bank executive compensation
proposal. Part IV concludes.
II. BANKS AND MORAL HAZARD
A bank is a delicate institution. Its predominant creditors are
depositors, who are typically quite numerous, with each holding only a
relatively small claim against the bank in the form of a deposit account. A
depositor can ordinarily withdraw her funds on deposit at any time,
effectively calling her loan to the bank by demanding immediate
repayment. The bank's ability to effect this routine transaction and to
attract future deposits, however, depends on public confidence in the bank's
ability to do so. In essence, a bank is a confidence scheme.
Banks of course do not hold all their depositors' cash in their
vaults. Instead, banks aggregate their demand deposits, relending them in
the form of fixed-term loans. What this means in balance sheet terms is
that banks' assets and liabilities are mismatched. Most of their liabilities-
in the form of demand deposits-are volatile, potentially short-term loans,
but their assets are typically longer-term loans. Because of this mismatch
of relatively illiquid assets with extremely liquid liabilities, banks are
vulnerable to runs. Historically, fear of a bank's imminent failure triggered
a frenzy of depositors all wanting their money back at the same time. In
this scenario, individual depositors face a collective action problem. When
every other depositor is racing to the bank to withdraw her funds before the
bank fails, then I will, too. I will want to retrieve my money before the
bank window slams shut for good. The run becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy, causing a liquidity crisis even at a solvent bank, which causes the
bank to fail.
Deposit insurance addresses this peculiar balance sheet of banks.
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress established the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure the deposits of member
banks. The federal guarantee of bank deposits prevents most runs because
depositors are confident that FDIC insurance will cover failed banks'
deposit liabilities.
4 Kose John et al., A Theory of Bank Regulation and Management Compensation,
13 REv. FIN. STUD. 95, 97 (2000) (arguing that FDIC deposit insurance pricing
should account for bank managers' compensation arrangements).
5 Until recently, the ceiling on deposit insurance was $100,000 per depositor. The
passage of EESA temporarily raised the basic limit to $250,000, which is set to
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Deposit insurance creates problematic incentives, though. Even
with nonfinancial firms, which are less levered and not generally at risk of
having to pay off their major liabilities on demand, a conflict exists
between equity holders and creditors. As the finance canon has taught us,
debt and equity generally hold differing risk preferences. Because lenders
enjoy only a fixed upside-their interest payments and return of principal at
a loan's termination-but equity's upside is unlimited, firm managers bent
on maximizing shareholder wealth will pursue riskier investments than
lenders prefer. 6 High leverage generally magnifies this debt-equity conflict
and managers' risk taking tendencies. 7 With banks, this agency cost of
debt is even worse.
Ordinary firms' contract creditors understand firm managers' risk
taking predilections, so these creditors bargain for constraints on managers
and monitor compliance. 8 In addition, excessive risk taking increases
borrowing costs for ordinary nonfinancial companies. At the limit, a risky
firm may not be able to borrow at any price. However, banks' major
creditors-insured depositors--do not impose these contract or market
constraints on risky banks. Depositors do not monitor or price their credit
to account for insolvency or liquidity risk because FDIC insurance covers
the risk. Bank managers may shirk or steal; they may faithfully pursue
wealth maximization for shareholders by extending risky high-interest
loans. In any event, depositors do not care. They are largely indifferent to
bank risk taking. 9
return to $100,000 after December 31, 2009. Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). See also Letter from FDIC,
Financial Institution Letter, Deposit Insurance Coverage Temporary Increase in
Coverage, FIL-102-2008 (Oct. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2008/fil08102.pdf.
6 Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334 (1976)
(discussing the agency costs of debt versus equity).
7 1d; see also Teresa A. John & Kose John, Top-Management Compensation and
Capital Structure, 48 J. FIN. 949, 951 (1993).
8 Banks, for example, play an important monitoring role for their borrowers. See
Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private
Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 (2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1356662.
9 The product market discipline that affects nonfinancial firms also does not operate
on banks. In a competitive market for deposit taking and other financial services,
customers would care about bank solvency and would channel their deposits
accordingly. FDIC insurance eliminates financial stability as a margin of
competition among banks. Moreover, deposit insurance premiums are not finely
calibrated to account for the particular risks posed by individual banks, so absent
perfect regulatory oversight, managers have an incentive to externalize losses to the
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Deposit insurance does not eliminate a creditor, of course; it merely
substitutes the government for depositors as the major creditor of the bank,
which ultimately gets stuck with the losses if the bank fails. The
government as creditor has an economic interest in constraining managerial
slack and excessive risk taking. Regulatory agencies and their bank
examiners represent the government in this endeavor. Unlike private
creditors of nonfinancial firms, however, regulators do not have their own
money on the line. So while they possess significant expertise and enjoy
important regulatory powers, they may lack the strong incentives of private
lenders toward efficient monitoring. Private lenders with their own money
on the line will expend resources monitoring only to the point where the
marginal cost of monitoring does not exceed the marginal benefit.
Government regulators do not have such finely honed incentives. The
extent of their monitoring is politically determined. In some cases, their
regulation and supervision may be excessive; in others, it may be
insufficient. The prospect of regulatory capture of course also lurks.
In this context, private-sector monitoring and market discipline
may be useful adjuncts to regulatory oversight. Current banking law
recognizes as much. For example, the largest national banks are required to
issue long-term investment grade unsecured debt if they control a financial
subsidiary. "0 My proposal builds on this market discipline approach by
giving bank managers direct market-based incentives to curb excessive risk
taking.
III. BOND1NG BANKERS
Examination and supervision impose useful limits on bank risk
taking, and capital requirements help assure banks' solvency. However,
these approaches seem indirect and second best for not addressing
managerial incentives. " Instead of relying solely on these indirect
influences, regulators may be able to bond bank executives to more prudent
banking practices with pay-for-performance incentives that include
instruments that are sensitive to risk. Publicly traded subordinated debt
securities may be ideal for this task. Compensating bankers at least in part
with subordinated debt may offer bankers the right incentives to avoid
excessive risk.
insurance pool-and indirectly to the healthy banks that contribute to the pool and
the taxpayers that ultimately stand behind the insurance pool.
'0 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(3).
1 "See John, et al., supra note 4, at 97.
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A. Standard Pay for Performance
The standard corporate governance arrangements that affect
managers' decision making -fiduciary duties and shareholder voting, for
example-are generally designed to benefit the firm's equity holders. 12
Similarly, pay-for-performance compensation-typically in the form of
equity or equity-based options-intends to overcome managers' risk
aversion in order to align their incentives with shareholders' more risk-
preferring interests. Otherwise, managers with firm-specific human capital
investments in their firms might be less willing to pursue risky but
potentially profitable projects. Their undiversifiable human capital
investments make them imperfect agents for diversified shareholders. 13
The pay-for-performance movement of the 1990s led boards of
directors and their compensation consultants to adopt equity-based
compensation schemes. 14 Tax code changes abetted this trend. In general,
employee compensation is deductible to the employer firm as a business
expense. Since 1994, only the first $1 million of non-performance based
compensation for public company executives is deductible. I5 As a result of
these changes, 16 the percentage of executive compensation in the form of
equity jumped from 37% to 55% in the ten years ending in 2003. " Pay-
12 Jon Macey and Maureen O'Hara have suggested broadened fiduciary duties for
bank directors to include creditors along with shareholders as beneficiaries. In
particular, they propose that bank directors consider solvency risk "explicitly and
systematically" in their decision making, upon pain of personal liability for failing
to do so. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Corporate Governance of
Banks, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV., April 2003, at 91, 92. This approach may be
problematic, however. Duties to multiple constituents may render bank managers
accountable to no one. Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate
Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 36 (1991). More generally, corporate
duties seem a rather blunt device for regulating risk taking, and may invite 20-20
hindsight litigation in the aftermath of a bank failure.
13 See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-it's Not How Much
You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990 at 138, 142. With only fixed
compensation, managers may also be tempted shirk or to build empires, since pay
is typically associated with firm size. Id. at 150.
14 See, e.g., id. at 141.; see also Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 235
(1990).
15 26 U.S.C. Internal Revenue Code § 162(m) (2006).
16 Evidence suggests that the enactment of section 162(m) has reduced salaries and
increased pay-for-performance sensitivity. See Tod Perry & Mark Zenner, Pay for
Performance?: Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation
Contracts, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 456 (2001).
17 Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL'Y 283, 289 tbl. 4 (2005). available at
http://ssnr.com/abstract=648682.
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for-performance sensitivity for CEOs-typically measured by the change in
CEO wealth for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth 18 -increased
more than tenfold between 1980 and 1999.'9 Compensation for bank
officers currently tracks the same basic shareholder-based incentive
framework, and managers' equity stakes have been shown to be
significantly correlated with bank returns and risk.20
Whether or not pay for performance has been generally good for
shareholders is the subject of some debate. 21 For bank managers, however,
equity-based compensation may encourage excessive risk taking that is
inimical to the public interest in bank safety and soundness. Aligning
managers' interests more closely with those of bank equity holders simply
exacerbates the moral hazard that accompanies deposit insurance. High
leverage, coupled with the fact that banks' major creditors-insured
depositors-have no stake in curbing banks' risk taking, already encourages
managers to choose risky strategies, even those with negative expected
value. Equity-based compensation merely adds fuel to the fire. It gives
bank managers a direct personal stake in the unlimited upside they might
potentially enjoy with high risk, high return strategies, an approach that
bank regulators typically wish to discourage. 22
B. Issuing Public Subordinated Debt
The idea of requiring banks to issue public debt securities has been
the subject of discussion for several decades. " An issue of subordinated
18 See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 19, at 229.
'9 Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of US Corporate Governance:
What's Right and What's Wrong?, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 12 (2003).2 0 See Anthony Saunders et al,, Ownership Structure, Deregulation and Bank Risk-
Taking, 45 J. FIN. 643, 644 (1990).
21 For critical views, see LUCIAN BECHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
(2004); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried, & David I. Walker,
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753 (2002); Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The
Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1880 (1992)
(reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)).
22 One commentator even argues that pay-for-performance sensitivity should be
accounted for in the pricing of deposit insurance. See John, supra note 4, at 98.
23 See Mark J. Flannery & Sorin M. Sorescu, Evidence of Bank Market Discipline
in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983-1991, 51 J. FIN. 1347, 1348 (1996); see
also Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Sub-debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk
Measures, 20 J. FIN. SERVICES. RES. 121, 122 (2001); William W. Lang & Douglas
D. Robertson, Analysis of Proposals for a Minimum Subordinated Debt
Requirement, 54 J. ECON. & BuS. 115, 124124123 (2002). Under the Gramm-
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debt-junior to depositor liabilities-imposes discipline on the issuing bank
in at least two ways. First, debt holders contract with issuers for covenants
that constrain issuers' risk taking, and debt holders are typically
sophisticated institutional investors with the resources and expertise to
monitor their borrowers. Second, the trading price of the subordinated debt
is sensitive to the bank's risk taking. Unlike depositor creditors,
bondholders do not enjoy federal insurance against losses and cannot
demand immediate repayment. If the bank were to fail, bondholders would
be repaid only after all depositors-including uninsured depositors-were
repaid in full. With a long- or medium-term bond, the bondholder is
invested in the bank's future.
Banks engaging in excessively risky strategies will likely see their
subdebt trading prices drop, giving valuable information to both market
participants and regulators. In the face of real trouble, debt holders may
either take action to enforce their covenants-typically a very public
maneuver-or they may sell. In either case, information is made public.
Empirical evidence supports the view that subordinated debt imposes
market discipline on banks. 24
In addition to medium-term maturity for the bonds, proposals for
mandatory issuance of subordinated debt also typically recommend
relatively frequent staggered periodic issuance-say, every two years-in
order to force the bank continually to return to the public capital markets
for refinancing. 25 So in addition to the medium- to long-term focus driven
by the maturity of the bonds, bank managers would have incentives toward
continual short-term vigilance as well, in order to keep bank borrowing
costs low. A bank taking on excessive risk would pay a higher interest
spread when it went to sell subordinated debt in the public bond markets.
Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), a large FDIC member bank wishing to control a financial
subsidiary must have an issue of highly rated debt outstanding. Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 6801-6827 (1999)). GLB also commissioned
the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury Department to study the feasibility of
requiring large banks and bank holding companies to issue subordinated debt as a
device to improve market discipline. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 108, 15 U.S.C. §
6808(a) (2006).
24 See Kose John et al., Outside Monitoring and CEO Compensation in the Banking
Industry (Oct. 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=497922 (finding a
statistically significant relationship between the degree of subordinated debt holder
monitoring and pay-for-performance sensitivity); see also Evanoff & Wall, supra
note 28, at 122; Flannery & Sorescu, supra note 28, at 1356-1362.
25 The proceeds of each issuance would be used to retire some portion of
outstanding subordinated debt. For example, a bank might issue $100 million
worth of 6-year bonds every two years. By the end of year six, the bank would
have $100 million of subordinated debt maturing every two years. The proceeds of
each new issuance would be used to repay the maturing tranche of debt.
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C. Pay for Less Risky Performance
For incentive purposes, the form of compensation is crucial, as
Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy declaimed in the title of their famous
26Harvard Business Review article, It's Not How Much You Pay, But How.
In the same way that equity and equity-based options help align managers'
incentives with those of shareholders, including debt would shift managers'
incentives away from risk-preferring equity to align more closely with more
risk averse debt holders. The greater the proportion of bank managers'
wealth that is in the form of subordinated debt, the less risky they are likely
to be with the bank's business strategies. The presence of debt in
managers' compensation packages may more closely align their interests
with regulators' in assuring banks' safety and soundness. 27
Salary, pensions, and other fixed aspects of executive compensation
already serve to some extent as debt-like compensation, since they give
managers fixed claims against their firms. Empirical evidence suggests that
this inside debt dampens CEOs' risk-shifting incentives. Studies have
linked the level of CEOs' pensions with reduced risk taking. 28 Including
subordinated debt securities improves on this incentive structure because
risk-related fluctuations in the trading price of the debt may promptly and
directly affect bank managers' wealth. In this way, the fine market
reflection of managerial risk taking generates both important incentive and
information effects.
A broad incentive system would also include holding requirements
for this subordinated debt compensation. Especially if the bank adopted a
rolling schedule of periodic debt issuance as described above, it would
make sense for managers to receive subordinated debt from each issue and
to be required to hold the debt for some significant portion of its maturity.
This holding requirement, coupled with opportunities for managers to sell a
26 See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 18.
27 Perfect alignment of course is not desirable; regulators might be perfectly happy
with very low risk and return, though investors would not.
28 See Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt
andIts Role in Managerial Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1557 (2007) (finding a
positive association between large CEO inside debt holdings and lower risk
taking); Joseph Gerakos, CEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and
Optimal Contracting, Pension Research Council Working Paper 2007-5, April 23,
2007, available at: http://ssm.com/abstract-982180 (finding higher CEO pension
values in firms with higher credit quality); Chenyang Wei & David Yermack,
Stockholder and Bondholder Reactions to Revelations of Large CEO Inside Debt
Holdings: An Empirical Analysis, September 2009, available at:
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/cri/l/ (finding evidence that outside investors
expect that managers with large inside debt holdings will manage more
conservatively).
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portion of their subordinated debt holdings into the public markets
periodically, would complement the twin goals of the bank's rolling debt
issuance described earlier. Holding the bank's medium-term debt would
encourage managers to adopt a medium- to long-term perspective in their
decision making, and the periodic opportunity to sell would encourage
managers' continuing vigilance regarding risk taking at the bank. In
general, managers would be concerned about maintaining and increasing
the trading price of the subdebt, which would discourage excessive risk
taking.
D. Implementation
To this point, even a reader favorably disposed to my proposal may
reasonably worry about how these banker bonding arrangements might be
implemented. Dictating banker bonding would seem rather intrusive, given
the private contractual nature of executive compensation arrangements. 29
Moreover, government mandates may be difficult to structure without
falling prey to rent seeking interest groups, and they may be difficult to
tailor to specific banks' conditions or to revise in the face of changed
conditions. Calibrating the right mix of debt- and equity-based
compensation might be tricky and may depend on bank-specific factors,
30including capitalization and investment opportunities.
Rather than mandates, a feasible approach that avoids many of the
pitfalls of a mandatory approach would be to incorporate the risk-reducing
features of bank officers' compensation arrangements in calibrating banks'
deposit insurance premiums. 31 This approach would incentivize but not
mandate some form of banker bonding. Other incentive schemes may also
be worth exploring. 32
29 For banks receiving government bailout funds, of course, the government's
intervention is conceptually much more easily justified. The current Financial
Stability Plan already incorporates certain bank executive compensation
requirements. Treasury Department, Executive Compensation,
http://www.financialstability.gov/about/executive compensation.html (last visited
Aug. 27, 2009). See also supra note 2.
30 See John et al., supra note 4, at 96 (noting that bank managers' risk-shifting
incentives depend crucially on the characteristics of the bank's investment
opportunities).
"' See id.
32 For example, some form of income tax incentive could also be useful. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Market discipline may always be a useful adjunct to regulatory
oversight. Happily, scholars and policy makers have already discussed the
prospects for using publicly traded subordinated debt to discipline banks'
risk taking. Contractual covenants directly constrain risk taking, and
market pricing may signal excessive risk taking to both investors and
regulators. As a practical matter, mandating subordinated debt issuance for
the nation's largest banks effects no drastic regulatory burden, since most of
the largest commercial banks and bank holding companies already issue
subordinated debt. 33  For the purpose of containing systemic risk, the
largest banks will be the most important.
I take the idea of bank subordinated debt a step further, borrowing
from the pay-for-performance literature to suggest that subordinated debt be
included in bank managers' compensation packages. As equity
compensation is used to align managers' interests with those of
shareholders, subordinated debt compensation could be used to align bank
managers' interests with those of creditors and regulators. Admittedly,
important details of this approach will need to be worked out through
practical experience. In this time of critical regulatory re-examination and
experimentation, however, bonding bankers to less risky strategies seems a
worthy project.
33 At the end of 1998, 45 of the 50 largest commercial banks and 48 of the largest
50 bank holding companies had issued subordinated debt. Lang & Robertson,
supra note 28, at 124.

